



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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6 April 1979

Mr. John L. Frisbee
Editor
Air Force Magazine
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Frisbee:

On page 17 of your April issue under the "Washington Observations" section of In Focus written by Edgar Ulsamer are comments attributed to Admiral Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence.

I am enclosing an excerpt from the transcript of Admiral Turner's remarks to the Harvard Club of Washington, D. C. on 14 February and from the question and answer session which followed. These are presumably the comments to which Mr. Ulsamer's source referred. As you can see they mean quite something else when viewed in toto.

It is distressing when we are trying so hard to be open with the public by hosting groups such as the Harvard Club that the Director's comments should be so distorted by someone in attendance. But that is understandable because some folks only hear what they want to hear.

What I don't understand is why Mr. Ulsamer chose to run the piece without the courtesy of checking it with our office. He is well aware of our existence. We would have been happy to respond.

Sincerely,

A rectangular box used to redact the signature of the Director of Public Affairs.

Herbert E. Hetu
Director of Public Affairs

Enclosures

Excerpts from Admiral Turner's remarks to Harvard Club of Washington, D. C. , February 14, 1979:

"We are now having to see how we bring up a new leadership, a new leadership that is able and willing and understanding of adjusting to living under new rules of oversight, to living in a more public exposure, to shifting the focus of activities here from the cold war attitudes and the cold war targets and the cold war analyses we were so accustomed to in the past, to the new environment in which we have to live today. It is a challenge, again, to find the people who are flexible, adaptable, understanding of these shifts and emphasis, these changes I'm trying to describe to you, and who will pick up the mantle of leadership of this Agency in the years just ahead.

And, indeed, a fourth change that we are experiencing is a change in the priorities of what we do. We started out 32 years ago with a large focus on Soviet military intelligence, or intelligence about Soviet military activities. Look how the world has changed around us in these 32 years. Yes, we are intently interested today on Soviet military activities. We have to be. But look at how many other countries in the world appear on the front page of our newspaper, how many with whom we have commercial relationships of one sort and another. Look at how much of our activity in many, many of these other countries is not military at all. Our relationships with most of them are economic or political. The excitement, the challenge, the stimulation here to shift, to develop the expertise, the academic qualifications in all sorts of fields that challenge us today as we move more and more into political, economic analysis, into questions of terrorism, narcotics, psychology of foreign leaders, health and medical predictions on foreign personalities and so on. It's a really very exciting expansion of our activities."

Excerpts from Question & Answer period following Admiral Turner's remarks to the Harvard Club of Washington, D. C. on 14 February 1979:

QUESTION: My question has to do with the collection of foreign political intelligence from open sources, pretty much open sources, and in manners which are legal in most countries. I've read in the paper criticisms of the CIA for alleged failures to warn the government of what was going to happen in Iran. And it seems to me that much of that intelligence was the sort that traditionally was gathered by the ambassador and the State Department.

And I wonder if you would like to comment and explain the relationship between the intelligence gathering of the CIA and the information gathering that is within the province of the State Department.

ADMIRAL TURNER:

That's a very fine comment.

Can you all hear that in the back? I'll repeat questions if you raise your hands back there if you can't hear them.

A very astute question. When you usually say something like that, it means that I'm trying to think of the answer.

(Laughter)

Seriously, the State Department always has been and today is one of the major inputs to our information bank here. They share with us the reporting, clearly, of the ambassadors and others overseas. So do other departments of the government. It would be a crime for the government to have information and not make it available where needed.

The degree of coordination between the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department has, I think, improved markedly in the last several years, and we've made a major effort in that direction, and it is a good relationship today.

submarine can "destroy even large and medium-sized city in the Soviet Union." Some congressional experts are challenging this contention on technical grounds. Poseidon SSBNs normally carry ten warheads on each of their sixteen SLBMs for a total of 160 individual weapons. Yet there are at least 204 Soviet cities with populations above 100,000. Further, the range of the SLBMs—at least until the new Trident I (C-4) missile is retrofitted beginning next year—is inadequate to reach a significant percentage of these cities. Also, the "MIRV footprint," the size of the area within which the individual warheads from an SLBM can be targeted, is limited. In most cases, the distance between Soviet cities is far greater than the SLBM's footprint. Finally, the forty-kiloton yield of a Poseidon RV is below the damage level prescribed by current US targeting and deterrence doctrine. Hence, several RVs would have to be directed against a single city. Congressional critics believe that the President's statement about the Poseidon's capabilities typifies the frequent inadequacy of defense information furnished the White House by the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

North Korea's Underestimated Military Power

After the recent setbacks to free world and US interests in Iran, Afghanistan, and Africa, Congress seems bent on cooling the Administration's ardor for withdrawing US ground troops from South Korea. In a speech on the House floor, Rep. Samuel E. Stratton (D-N. Y.), for instance, asked about public allegations that the Korean troop-withdrawal plan also called for removing US tactical nuclear weapons from that country and replacing them with dummy warheads. He asserted that "... we cannot countenance any strategic plan [that] could increase the risk of war [and that is] being carried out deliberately in a way that would bypass the Congress and the constitutional requirements of our government." The Administration has not yet responded to Mr. Stratton's request for information on that issue.

In Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, meanwhile, the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command in Korea, Army Gen. John W. Vessey, testified that "North Korea has a much larger and better-equipped military force than

has been previously believed. Before this most recent reassessment, which has yet to be ... concluded by the intelligence community, we credited the North Koreans with a two-to-one advantage in tanks, artillery, and tactical aircraft. We thought they had a four-to-one advantage in naval combatants, including a three-to-one advantage in missile-attack craft. We now believe that the North is much stronger in artillery, tanks, and overall combat capability than was estimated a year ago." General Vessey also disclosed that "there may be some difficulty" in the ROK Army's ability to operate all the weapon systems that it was to take over from the departing US Army under the Administration's original schedule.

Even though he declined to speculate about North Korea's intentions, General Vessey told the Senate that "the nature of the North's deployments, its available weaponry, and the sheer number of its units justifies the perception of offensive intent. It is clear that this force has the ability to launch a major invasion of the ROK with little warning. Unequivocal evidence of the North's aggressive posture is found in its active clandestine infiltration of the South by sea and by land, and its unrelenting burrowing of tunnels under the DMZ [demilitarized zone]. On 17 October 1978, United Nations Command counter-tunnel operations exposed a third North Korean tunnel, dug deep under the military demarcation line and well into the southern DMZ. Detection devices indicate that more tunnels are being dug. These tunnels represent clear violations of the Armistice agreement. They serve no purpose other than surprise attack at a time advantageous to the North."

The White House has now indicated that the Administration will exercise caution in further withdrawal of US ground forces from South Korea, at least until the belated intelligence assessment is completed.

Washington Observations

- On February 20 of this year the Central Intelligence Agency—represented by four senior officials—was to furnish the R&D Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee with a full, unabridged briefing on a CIA study of Soviet deceptions prior to, during, and after SALT I. This so-called Sullivan study—named for its principal au-

thor, David S. Sullivan, a strategic analyst who subsequently resigned from the CIA (see "In Focus ...", January '79), exposes Soviet duplicity in negotiating past arms-control agreements and documents the near-absolute control of the Soviet military over the USSR's SALT policies. But to the subcommittee's surprise and chagrin, the four CIA officials were prepared only to provide a watered-down, abbreviated version—presumably less foreboding than the complete briefing so far as the prospects for Soviet compliance with SALT II are concerned. Rep. Richard Ichord (D-Mo.), the chairman of the subcommittee, protested the CIA's evasion of what the subcommittee viewed as its constitutional prerogatives, namely complete access to relevant information.

- CIA Director Adm. Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.), recently caused raised eyebrows with some startling assertions before Washington's Harvard Club. The nation's top intelligence officer reportedly told the group during a briefing at CIA headquarters that the cold war is "over" and that there are "more important things" to worry about than the Soviet Union. Admiral Turner also struck an ominous note when he declared that it would be "criminal" for other government agencies—meaning probably such organizations as the National Security Agency, DIA, and the military services' intelligence units—not to share intelligence information with the CIA. Some intelligence experts attending the briefing were struck by the CIA Director's emphasis of political factors and his apparent downplaying of fundamental intelligence concerns.

- At this writing, contradictory signals are being sent out by various elements of the executive branch of government about the imminence of SALT II's conclusion. On balance, the prospects for a relatively speedy windup appear to be reasonably bright. It has become obvious, however, that playing the "China Card," at the time and in the manner chosen by President Carter, turned out to be no trump. Soviet intractability solidified immediately, even though major US concessions have satisfied almost all Soviet demands. The only major unresolved issue centers on what constitutes, in the sense of SALT II, a new ICBM and what is to be considered a modification of an existing system. The US contends

InFocus...

BY EDGAR ULSAMER, SENIOR EDITOR

Washington, D. C., March 5
Airmobile MX

The Air Force, in the current re-examination of survivable basing modes of MX, is determined to give the airmobile concept a fair chance even though to date all the available evidence confirms that MPS (Multiple Protective Structures, in effect vertical shelters amongst which an ICBM would be dispersed in shell-game fashion) remains the most cost-effective solution.

According to Maj. Gen. Kelly H. Burke, Director of Operational Requirements, USAF DCS/RD&A, airmobile ICBM concepts have been studied extensively in the past by the Air Force and other elements of the Defense Department, but "there have not been studies in depth in the last three years and during that time we acquired better understanding of short takeoff and landing technology as applied to transport ... aircraft—a technology that supports a new concept of a dispersible airmobile system. In view of the magnitude and importance of MX, I think it altogether proper that we thoroughly examine this new technology and concept."

USAF's second look at airmobile systems—directed by the Defense Department late last year—has matured over the past few weeks into a relatively firm system. Key element of the proposed weapon is a four-engine STOL aircraft, derived from either the YC-14 or YC-15 AMST prototype designs built by McDonnell Douglas and Boeing, and to be hardened against overpressure and electromagnetic pulse to the same extent as the B-1 strategic bomber test aircraft. Between 200 and 300 missile-carriers would be acquired, each one accommodating an MX weighing at least 150,000 pounds and fitted with ten warheads (the maximum number permitted under the pending SALT II agreement). In addition, there would be eighty to 100 training aircraft that also could serve in a communication relay role during crises or war. About seventy-five percent of the MX carriers would be on alert at all times.

Under normal peacetime conditions, the aircraft would be stationed at between thirty and fifty alert bases located in the central region of the country, at least 700 miles from the oceans as a measure of protection against Soviet SLBM attack and sufficiently dispersed to reduce the risk of barrage-bombing by Soviet ICBMs.

During periods of tension, the MX carriers would be dispersed to about 150 primary dispersal sites as well as to some of the secondary dispersal sites that are available, whence the National Command Authorities (NCA) could direct them to go on airborne alert and eventually launch their missiles. Launch would take place in flight and would be accomplished by extracting the ICBM by parachute through the aircraft's tailgate. Since the objective of the airmobile basing mode is to furnish the US with a sustainable war-fighting capability, the secondary dispersal sites could also serve as recovery sites. These sites would include general-aviation facilities with runways hard enough to permit at least one landing and take-off by an MX carrier. (The weight of the aircraft exceeds the weight limits of most runways of this type.) Other sites could include salt flats, interstate highway sections, and dry lakebeds. Maintenance and support of the airmobile MX system would take place at five special sites situated in the same general area as the alert bases.

USAF's reevaluation of survivable MX basing modes was to be forwarded to the Defense Department by March 30 of this year. Should the decision go in favor of the airmobile approach, USAF might develop two competitive designs and carry the program forward to a competitive flyoff between the McDonnell Douglas and Boeing systems. Some of the MX ICBMs, according to the latest plans, could also be deployed in silos.

President Carter plans to personally review and rule on the Defense Department's recommendations concerning the MX missile and how to base it, according to Dr. William J.

Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. In briefing congressional staff members, he also said that while he hoped that the Defense Department will be in a position to make a decision on basing mode by April 1, a delay of perhaps as long as a year would not adversely affect the program if full-scale engineering development of the missile itself is authorized this spring.

One of the White House's consultants on the MX basing program, Dr. R. L. Garwin, meanwhile counseled against deploying MX in the MPS basing mode while appearing as a witness before the House Armed Services Committee. Dr. Garwin, a mainstay of the group of academicians assembled by Presidential science and technology advisor Dr. Frank Press to review USAF and Defense Department basing mode recommendations, advocated instead that MX be deployed in an airmobile mode or on subsurface operating in the shallow waters above the continental shelf.

The latter concept, a long-time favorite of the inventive Dr. Garwin, envisions slow-moving bottom-crawling submarines, each carrying two MX ICBMs, to replace the land-based leg of the triad. Command and control would be provided by long fiber optics cables that could be plugged into various undersea junction boxes. Earlier Defense Department analyses of this scheme concluded that it required a number of technological breakthroughs, not yet in sight, and that it lacked operational merit.

The White House consultant also told the committee that if MPS were deemed necessary, the system should use a 20,000-pound single warhead missile, rather than a MIRVed (ten warheads) 150,000-pound-plus missile as recommended by the Air Force and the Defense Science Board. His reasoning that such a small missile represents a more cost-effective countermeasure to the growing number of Soviet ICBM warheads than does a large MIRVed missile is totally at odds with Air Force and Defense Department findings.

Brightening the State of the Union

In his State of the Union address on January 23, President Jimmy Carter asserted that just one Poseidon

submarine can "destroy every large and medium-sized city in the Soviet Union." Some congressional experts are challenging this contention on technical grounds. Poseidon SSBNs normally carry ten warheads on each of their sixteen SLBMs for a total of 160 individual weapons. Yet there are at least 204 Soviet cities with populations above 100,000. Further, the range of the SLBMs—at least until the new Trident I (C-4) missile is retrofitted beginning next year—is inadequate to reach a significant percentage of these cities. Also, the "MIRV footprint," the size of the area within which the individual warheads from an SLBM can be targeted, is limited. In most cases, the distance between Soviet cities is far greater than the SLBM's footprint. Finally, the forty-kiloton yield of a Poseidon RV is below the damage level prescribed by current US targeting and deterrence doctrine. Hence, several RVs would have to be directed against a single city. Congressional critics believe that the President's statement about the Poseidon's capabilities typifies the frequent inadequacy of defense information furnished the White House by the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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InFocus...

that any modification of an existing model that either increases or decreases the missile's size by more than five percent is a new design—and thus is prohibited. The Soviets have not accepted that understanding and seek the option to reduce missile size by up to twenty percent. The US recently yielded on two points: the number of cruise missiles that can be carried by a cruise missile carrier aircraft has been reduced from thirty-five to twenty-eight at Soviet insistence. Encryption of telemetry data transmissions during ICBM test-flights is now prohibited only where information pertinent to verification of treaty adherence is involved. How the US will be able to verify that encrypted Soviet data are not needed to verify Soviet compliance is unclear, especially since most congressional experts believe that all flight-test data are, of and by themselves, an intrinsic part of the verification process. In spite of the ground given by the US negotiators, both the rate of SALT progress and the mood of the Soviet negotiators, subsequent to the Sino-US rapprochement, remained glacial for more than two months.

• SALT, as defined by Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey (R-N. H.), stands in Soviet eyes for "Stop the American Lead in Technology." At a press conference sponsored by the American Security Council and Congress's Coalition for Peace Through Strength that featured Senator Humphrey and former Air Force Secretary Thomas C. Reed, it was disclosed that any new Soviet strategic bomber—at least one such weapon system is under development according to the Defense Department's latest Annual Report—will not be counted under the SALT II rules as long as it carries only nuclear bombs or air-launched cruise missiles with a range less than 600 kilometers. Mr. Reed, one of the most respected Secretaries in the history of the Air Force, told the Washington press that the Administration "is about to present to the American public a SALT II agreement which ignores the lessons of a half century of history. It disregards the opportunities offered and the dangers posed by the manned bomber." Urging that

the Administration not sign, and the Senate not ratify "any SALT agreement that does not recognize and constrain the Soviet Backfire bomber," Mr. Reed concurred with earlier AIR FORCE Magazine reports that US estimates of Backfire's range were too low. With a 5,000-mile range and a 25,000-pound payload, Backfire provides the Soviet Union with a "very good strategic reserve," thus further enhancing the Kremlin's sustained nuclear war-fighting capability, he said. The former Air Force Secretary asserted that the number of Backfires currently in service is "probably between 150 and 200." He estimated that the current annual production rate is between thirty-six and forty aircraft and that Backfire can carry ALCMs and/or Mach 3, 435-nautical-mile range AS-6 Kingfish nuclear-armed air-to-surface missiles. Mr. Reed confirmed that an improved production model known as the "C" or "ND" version is now in the Soviet inventory.

• A recent Air Force study of the capabilities of the new KC-10 Advanced Tanker Cargo Aircraft (ATCA) led to dramatic conclusions. Based on a scenario that required the deployment of eighteen F-15s, 115 tons of equipment, and 220 support personnel to Saudi Arabia, these comparative performance capabilities were established: Using current equipment, it would require sixteen KC-135s, three C-141s, and two C-5s. The mission could be executed only by using forward bases at the Azores and in Spain, whose availability is far from certain. Deploying the force would take two days. Using six KC-10s, no C-141s, no C-5s, and no forward bases, the deployment could be completed in one day. Some 26,000 gallons of fuel would be saved compared to the presently available force.

• Dr. Ruth M. Davis, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology, recently reported that carbon/carbon materials currently used on the nosetips of SLBM and ICBM RVs (warheads) "do not perform as well as desired under severe environmental conditions." USAF's ABRES program is to come up with improvements to assure that the accuracy of US ballistic missiles does not deteriorate because of nosecone erosion caused by rain, snow, or other adverse environmental factors, she said.

• Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN

(Ret.), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking recently to defense industry executives in Washington, excoriated the Administration's tentative plan to halt further erosion in the Middle East through the creation of the Fifth Fleet to cover the Indian Ocean. With the existing fleets sadly understrength and no ships available or on the ways, the Administration's action amounts to "gunboat diplomacy without gunboats," he said.

• A generally overlooked aspect of the SALT II accord is that the US total of 2,250 so-called central launch vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers) includes about 180 mothballed B-52s and four B-1 test aircraft. The B-52s have been cannibalized or have deteriorated to a point where they could not be restored to operational status at reasonable costs and within a reasonable time. The B-1 test aircraft, because of the President's decision to cancel production, never reached operational status.

• Under the aegis of the National Strategy Information Center, a group of prominent defense experts has formed a "Strategic Alternatives Team" to provide a range of "quick fix" options for redressing Soviet strategic advantages in the early 1980s. The group, which includes former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, concentrated on approaches that could reach operational status within a thousand days from program go-ahead. Among the options developed by the group are innovative ballistic missile defense systems, a revitalized US civil defense program, and multiple aim point (MAP) basing techniques for the Minuteman ICBM force.

• The Republican National Committee, in a stinging critique of the Administration's foreign and defense policies, termed them "shortsighted and dangerously inadequate," with the result that "America's reliability as an ally is in doubt, our military defenses are becoming less capable of maintaining peace every year, our international economic strength is rapidly deteriorating, our position in some of the most vital regions of the world is crumbling." The President, "in the absence of a defensible policy," the Republicans charged, "substitutes utterly meaningless incantations about strength while continuing a policy of defense cancellations, deferrals, and real budgetary reductions."